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I
INTRODUCTION
Serious consideration was given in the late 1970's to proposals to integrate
corporate and individual income taxes. These proposals focused primarily on
plans which would allow shareholders who received dividends from domestic
corporations to be given an income tax credit for all or a part of the corporate
tax paid on the income from which the dividends were paid.I The argument
for allowing shareholders to have a tax credit to offset the corporate tax paid
was primarily economic: that it would increase the funds available for
investment by corporations and, by making equity securities a relatively more
attractive investment than before, increase the portion of corporate funds
raised through the issuance of equity securities. Since the idea was to
encourage distributions to shareholders, integration also implied a relatively
high capital gains tax, at least on the sales of corporate stock, in order to tax
retained corporate earnings at a relatively high rate.
While increasing corporate investment has undeniably continued to be a
goal of tax legislation since the integration debate, it is apparent that, at least
through the 1984 Tax Reform Act,2 we have come full circle, choosing instead
to reduce corporate tax liabilities by larger deductions and credits, to reduce
the capital gains tax for individuals (and thus the tax burden on retained
corporate earnings), and to strengthen the taxation of corporate distributions
to shareholders. This approach to increasing corporate investment began
with the Tax Reform Act of 19793 and has been continued by subsequent
legislation. The Treasury tax reform proposals4 made at the end of 1984
would reverse this trend, but their future is uncertain.
Copyright © 1985 by Law and Contemporary Problems
* Partner, Sullivan & Cromwell. I wish to acknowledge the invaluable assistance that Sally
Colinvaux provided in the preparation of this article.
1. E.g., U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, BLUEPRINTS FOR BASIC TAX REFORM (1977); STAFF OF THE
JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., TAX POLICY AND CAPITAL FORMATION (Comm. Print
1977); Feldstein & Frisch, Corporate Tax Integration: The Estimated Effects on Capital Accumulation and Tax
Distribution of Two Integration P'roposals, 30 NAT'L TAX J. 37 (1977); C. McLURE, MUST CORPORATE
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2. Pub. L. No. 98-369, 98 Stat. 494.
3. Pub. L. No. 95-618, 92 Stat. 3174.
4. U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT" TAX REFORM FOR FAIRNESS,
SIMPLICITY, AND ECONOMIC GROWTH (1984)(in three volumes: Vol. 1, Overview; Vol. 2, General
Explanation of the Treasury Proposals; and Vol. 3, Value-Added Tax) (hereinafter cited as TREAS.
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II
THE 1981 AND 1982 ACTS
Subchapter C was certainly not the focus of the Economic Recovery Tax
Act of 1981 ,5 which essentially left Subchapter C untouched except to provide
on a temporary basis for the tax-free reinvestment of certain public utility
dividends, 6 rules for reorganizations of financially troubled thrift institutions, 7
and for the effect of the new ACRS deductions on corporate earnings and
profits.8 There was no similar lack of attention to Subchapter C in the Tax
Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982. 9 With some spirit of true tax
reform, but more inspired by perceived abuses, Congress made a number of
significant changes to Subchapter C, of which by far the most far-reaching
were the amendments relating to the tax basis of an acquired corporation's
assets after a purchase of its stock. 10
A. Treatment of Acquisitons
When a corporation is acquired for a premium (i.e., a price in excess of its
net worth on a tax basis), a natural inquiry is whether the premium can be
assigned to the corporation's assets and recovered through depreciation or
otherwise in computing taxable income. The 1939 Code provided no
mechanism for such a reevaluation when the acquired corporation's stock was
acquired, but the courts in the Kimbell-Diamond line of cases" held that a
purchase of stock by one corporation followed by a prompt liquidation of the
acquired corporation would be treated from the purchaser's perspective as an
acquisition of the acquired corporation's assets, and this became part of the
Internal Revenue Code with the enactment of section 334(b)(2) in 1954. That
section provided in substance that if there were a purchase of control of one
corporation by another followed by a liquidation of the acquired corporation,
the basis of the acquired corporation's assets would be the price paid for its
stock increased by assumed liabilities of the acquired corporation. Thus, the
purchasing corporation could, by liquidating the acquired corporation or not,
elect to revalue its assets.
No particular tax policy was served by requiring a liquidation to effect
what might have been a straightforward election, and the liquidation
requirement could be a major headache where there were nontax reasons for
5. Pub. L. No. 97-34, 95 Stat. 172.
6. I.R.C. § 305(e) (Lawyers Co-op. 1983).
7. Id. § 368(a)(3)(D) (amended 1984).
8. Id § 312(K)(3) (amended 1984).
9. Pub. L. No. 97-248, 96 Stat. 324.
10. See infra notes 15-26 and accompanying text.
11. Kimbell-Diamond Milling Co. v. Commissioner, 14 T.C. 74 (1950), afdper curiam, 187 F.2d
718 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 827 (1951); see also United States v. M.O.J. Corp., 274 F.2d 713,
716-17 (5th Cir. 1960); United States v. Mattison, 273 F.2d 13, 17-20 (9th Cir. 1959); Georgia-Pacific
Corp. v. United States, 264 F.2d 161, 162-66 (5th Cir. 1959); Kanawha Gas & Utils. Co. v.
Commissioner, 214 F.2d 685, 691-92 (5th Cir. 1954); Montana-Dakota Utils. Co. v. Commissioner,
25 T.C. 408, 415-16 (1955), acq. 1956-2 C.B. 7.
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continuing the acquired corporation and its subsidiaries. In practice,
moreover, section 334(b)(2) did not work very well, at least from the Internal
Revenue Service's point of view. The parallel between a purchase of assets
and a purchase of stock followed by a liquidation was not complete. Since the
liquidation could be pursuant to a plan adopted as long as two years after the
acquisition, and distributions might continue for several years thereafter, the
assets actually distributed might be quite different than those held by the
acquired corporation at the time its stock was purchased. Adjustments to
basis for the period between the stock acquisition and the liquidating
distributions could result at a higher basis under section 334(b)(2) than on a
direct purchase of assets, essentially because of the treatment of interim
earnings and profits. 12 Since the recapture resulting from a section 334(b)(2)
liquidation was incurred after the acquisition, it could (unlike the recapture
incurred on a sale of assets) be offset by losses and other attributes of the
purchaser. Section 334(b)(2) was also selective insofar as it provided for a
separate election for each of the purchased corporation's subsidiaries.
More important, it was perceived in the late 1970's that if there was a
"partial liquidation" of the acquired corporation, which would be the case so
long as some minimal assets were retained, the basis of the distributed assets
would, under the consolidated return regulations, be adjusted to reflect the
price paid for the acquired corporation's stock and any liabilities assumed,
essentially as if there had been a section 334(b)(2) liquidation, but that not all
assets had to be distributed and that any recapture of investment tax credit
and most of the cost of any other recapture on the distributed assets would be
eliminated. 13 Consistent with the rules governing sales of assets, section
334(b)(2) had never overridden the provisions of the Internal Revenue Code
providing for the recapture of investment tax credit, depreciation, and other
items, and with the expansion of the recapture concept to include more and
more items, the cost of recapture had become a major impediment to a
section 334(b)(2) liquidation. Against that background, partial liquidations
were a bonanza.
The possibility of partial liquidations drove the changes made by the 1982
Act. While proposals to reform the acquisition rules were introduced in
Congress in the late spring of 1982,14 they might well have died but for the
acquisition of Marathon Oil by United States Steel. With the extensive
publicity given to the partial liquidation of Marathon Oil, the acquisition
proposals gained broader support and became part of the 1982 Act. As might
be expected, the amendments did not (because of their effective dates) affect
the partial liquidation of Marathon, but they attempt to ensure that it would
no longer be possible to do the same thing.
12. Treas. Reg. § 1.334-1(c)(4)(v)(a) (1984); e.g., R. M. Smith, Inc. v. Commissioner, 69 T.C.
317, 323-28 (1977), afdon other grounds, 591 F.2d 248, 255 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 828 (1979);
First Nat'l State Bank of New Jersey v. Commissioner, 51 T.C. 419, 427-28 (1968).
13. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.1502-.1514(c), 1.1502-.1531(b)(2)(ii) (1984).
14. Corporate Takeover Tax Act of 1982, H.R. 6295, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (introduced by
Representative Stark).
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Broadly speaking, the 1982 Act replaced the liquidation requirement with
a straightforward election, sought to conform the treatment of a stock
purchase followed by an election to the treatment of a sale of assets, and to
eliminate any selective write-up of assets.' 5 More specifically, the 1982 Act
replaces section 334(b)(2) with section 338 under which, when there has been
a qualifying stock purchase of one corporation by another, the purchaser may
elect to treat the assets of the acquired corporation as having been sold to a
new corporation for the price paid for the stock plus the liabilities of the
acquired corporation.' 6 The goal of section 338 is to conform the treatment
of a stock acquisition followed by such an election to the treatment of the sale
of assets. The election must be made promptly and in any event results in a
sale on the date of the qualifying stock purchase so that changes in the assets
of the acquired corporation subsequent to the stock purchase have no effect
on the tax treatment.' 7 Also, the optional sale occurs prior to consolidation
by the purchaser and so any recapture cannot be offset by the purchaser's
losses or other tax attributes.' 8 Partial liquidations are in effect abolished,
except for the tax treatment of certain noncorporate shareholders, and
elaborate rules are prescribed to ensure that all assets of the acquired
corporation and its affiliates are treated consistently as having been purchased
or not for tax purposes.' 9
B. Treatment of Redemptions
In addition to replacing section 334(b)(2) with section 338, the 1982 Act
also revised the statutory rules that provided for nonrecognition of gain by a
corporation on a reacquisition of shares of its stock for appreciated
property. 20 As originally enacted, the 1954 Code generally provided for the
nonrecognition of gain by a corporation on the distribution of property as a
dividend, in redemption of its stock or in liquidation.2' There were limited
exceptions (i.e., for distributions of LIFO inventories and installment
obligations), but apart from these, the 1954 Code explicitly incorporated the
General Utilities22 rule "that a corporation does not realize gain by reason of
distribution of its property." 23 The nonrecognition afforded to redemptions
was narrowed in 1969 in response to a number of offers by publicly-held
corporations to repurchase shares of their stock for appreciated holdings of
stock in other corporations, but important exceptions remained.2 4 There was
15. See I.R.C. § 338 (Lawyers Co-op. 1983) (amended 1984).
16. Id. § 338(a).
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. § 338(e), (f), (h).
20. I.R.C. § 311(d) (West 1978), amended by I.R.C. § 311(d) (Lawyers Co-op. 1983) (amended
1984).
21. Id. § 311(d) (West 1978).
22. General Utils. & Operating Co. v. Helvering, 296 U.S. 200 (1935).
23. S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 247 (1954); H. R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess.
37 (1954).
24. Pub. L. No. 91-172, 83 Stat. 487 (1969).
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nonrecognition of gain if the property used in the redemption consisted of
stock or an obligation of a 50% or greater owned subsidiary, and
nonrecognition was relied on in a number of transactions to convert what
otherwise might have been a taxable sale of a corporate asset into a
nontaxable transaction. Thus, Mobil tendered the stock of Esmark and,
pursuant to an agreement with Esmark, swapped the stock it acquired for an
Esmark subsidiary, Vickers Energy. The hope was that this would avoid the
gain that would have been recognized had Vickers simply been sold for cash.
There was also no recognition of gain on the complete redemption of a
stockholder that for at least one year had owned at least 10% of the
redeeming corporation's stock.
Responding to Mobil-Esmark and other transactions, the 1982 Act
repealed almost all of the broad-based exceptions to nonrecognition of gain
on a redemption of stock, limiting the exceptions to redemptions of
noncorporate shareholders with substantial and long-term holdings of the
corporation's stock. 25 Was such a broad-based repeal needed to deal with
these transactions? It was unclear whether Mobil-Esmark worked under
present law, and even if it did, it could have been cut off by requiring the
redeemed shareholder to have, say, a one year holding period. No doubt, the
failure to adopted more modest changes reflected a deep-seated view that it
was appropriate for corporations to recognize gain on all distributions of
appreciated property in redemption of stock.
Providing for the recognition of gain on redemptions of stock made with
appreciated property was, of course, a further erosion of the General Utilities
principle that no gain is realized on a disposition of property by way of
distribution to shareholders. This was not unrelated to the replacement of
section 334(b)(2) in the sense that one perceived abuse to which section 338
was directed was the ability to get a step-up in basis without the recognition at
the corporate level of the tax that would have been paid had the assets of the
acquired corporation been sold and the corporation liquidated. 26 Certainly
the congressional staffs perceived this connection, and the relationship
between achieving a cost basis for the assets of an acquired corporation and
the gain by the acquired corporation became explicit when they turned again
to Subchapter C.
C. The Subchapter S Revision Act
The 1982 Act was followed by the Subchapter S Revision Act of 1982.27
Although not directed at Subchapter C, that legislation is nonetheless
relevant. In the first place, by expanding eligibility for S-corporation
25. I.R.C. § 311(d)(2)(A), (B) (West 1978), amended by I.R.C. § 311(d) (Lawyers Co-op. 1983)
(amended 1984).
26. STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., SUMMARY OF THE REVENUE
PROVISIONS OF H.R. 4961, at 131-41 (Aug. 24, 1982).
27. Pub. L. No. 97-354, 96 Stat. 1669.
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treatment,2 8 it made S-corporation treatment a substantially more viable
alternative to Subchapter C. This occurred at a time when there was already
evidence of "disincorporation," that is, a flight from Subchapter C. The use
of depositary receipts for limited partnership interests (i.e., of ADR's) had
made possible the growth of publicly-traded limited partnerships, at least
where it was possible to effect a section 754 election so that the price paid by
new partners would be reflected in their shares of partnership taxable income;
and a number of the smaller oil companies had established publicly-traded
royalty trusts, largely through distributions to their shareholders. In addition,
the Subchapter S Revision Act had to deal with the transition between
Subchapter S and Subchapter C status, that is, what happens when an existing
corporation makes an S election and when an S election terminates. Section
1375 accomplished this by confirming that an S election was not a liquidation
and a termination of an S election was not an incorporation, but also by
imposing corporate tax on the "excess net passive income" of a former non-S
corporation that had accumulated earnings and profits and passive income in
excess of 25% of gross receipts and making such a corporation ineligible for
continued S treatment if it had passive income in excess of 25% of gross
receipts for three consecutive years. 29
The Subchapter S Revision Act also provided that S corporations would
recognize gain on any distribution of appreciated property to its
shareholders.30  The theory was that otherwise the gain would be
permanently untaxed since it would be acquired by the shareholders with a
fair market value basis. As that would be true whether or not there was an S
election, this change should be viewed as prefiguring the extension of the
same rule to corporations taxed under Subchapter C.
III
THE SUBCHAPTER C STUDY
The changes made to Subchapter C in the 1982 Act were evidently an
inspiration to the congressional staffs to do more. This part of the 1982 Act
was widely criticized, however, not only because of the speed with which the
changes were enacted but also on a substantive level. The rules in section 338
that were intended to enforce consistent treatment of all assets of the
acquired corporation and its affiliates went far beyond what was necessary,
and the question was raised as to whether changes in the rules for
nonrecognition of income on distributions of appreciated property should
have been adopted without consideration of the overall effect on the tax
system. The criticism had some effect and led to a more deliberate process.
In October of 1982, Senator Dole, Chairman of the Senate Finance
Committee, announced that he had directed the Senate Finance Committee
28. E.g., id. § 1361(b), 96 Stat. at 1669 (increased from 25 to 35 the permissible number of
shareholders).
29. Id. § 1362(d)(3), 96 Stat. at 1674, 1684.
30. Id. § 1363(d), 96 Stat. at 1677.
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Staff to study "corporate mergers, acquisitions and dispositions, net operating
losses, and related issues concerning the taxation of corporations and
shareholders." 3' Thereafter, the congressional staffs formed a group in which
a number of practitioners were asked to participate. In September of 1983,
after a number of meetings of this working group, the Staff of the Senate
Finance Committee came forth with a Preliminary Report on "The Reform
and Simplification of the Income Taxation of Corporations. '" 32
The proposals made in the Preliminary Report can really be divided into
three: first, a number of specific measures, such as those relating to the 85%
dividends received deduction, that were not as such related to the main line
acquisition and merger provisions, but were nonetheless far reaching and in a
number of cases later appeared in the 1984 Act; second, proposals to revise
extensively the tax treatment of acquisitions and mergers; and third,
proposals with respect to net operating loss and other carryovers following an
acquisition.
A. The Acquisition Proposals
With respect to acquisitions and mergers, the Preliminary Report
proposed that a simple election should determine whether assets acquired in a
"corporate acquisition" 33 would have a carryover (i.e., a historical) tax basis
or a tax basis equal to cost, and that the election would be available without
regard to whether the acquisition was of stock or assets or whether the
consideration for the acquisition is cash, stock, or other property. Thus, for
example, a cash acquisition of assets could be treated as a carryover basis
transaction and an all-stock merger as a cost basis transaction.
No cost basis election would be available for acquisitions between related
parties (i.e., where there was 50% or more common ownership of the
acquired and acquiring corporation). The election would, in general, be
made on a corporation-by-corporation basis so that, for example, one election
could be made with respect to the assets of an acquired parent corporation
and another with respect to the assets of a subsidiary of that corporation. A
limited consistency rule would make the election govern the basis of an asset
held by the target corporation within one year prior to the corporate
acquisition and acquired by the acquiring corporation within one year on
either side of the corporate acquisition. The "consistency" rules of section
338 would be conformed.
31. Press Release of Senator Bob Dole (October 28,1982).
32. STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON FINANCE, THE REFORM AND SIMPLIFICATION OF THE INCOME
TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (Comm. Print 1983).
33. Id. at 55-57. A qualifying corporate acquisition could be an acquisition of stock or of assets.
A stock acquisition would be qualified if stock possessing 80% of the voting power and 80% of all
other stock (except for nonvoting, nonparticipating preferred stock) is acquired in a 12-month
period from unrelated persons. An asset acquisition would be qualified if effected through a
statutory merger or consolidation, or a transaction or a series of transactions in which one
corporation acquires substantially all the assets of another corporation.
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As the price of a cost basis election and a relaxation of the section 338
consistency rules, however, the Preliminary Report proposed full recognition
of corporate gain and not just the recognition of "recapture" required by
present law. 34 Thus, if a cost basis was elected for the assets of an acquired
corporation, the acquired corporation would recognize gain or loss to the full
extent of any appreciation or depreciation in the value of its assets, except
that there would be separate elections to acquire goodwill and stock in foreign
corporations and DISC's with a carryover basis and without the recognition of
gain or loss. As a consequence, subject to those separate elections and (as
discussed below) the possibility of more general relief, the price of a step-up
would be full recognition of gain (and recapture of investment credit) by the
acquired corporation.
If a carryover (or historical) basis were elected for the assets of an acquired
corporation, the acquired corporation would not recognize gain (provided, in
the case of an asset acquisition, that the acquired corporation were liquidated
and the consideration received and any retained assets distributed to its
shareholders), and the tax basis and other attributes of the acquired
corporation would carry over (substantially as though there had been a
"reorganization" under present law).
The Preliminary Report proposed that stock received by a shareholder in a
corporation acquisition be tax free, regardless of whether the acquisition is
within the present law definition of a "reorganization," shareholders receive
cash or property other than stock, or the assets of the acquired corporation
are or are not "stepped up. ' 35 Thus, there would be no "continuity of
interest" requirement and the treatment of shareholders would be
determined separately from the treatment of the corporations involved in the
acquisition. Stock for this purpose would include stock of the acquiring
corporation and of any affiliated corporation above it in the chain of
affiliation.
As under present law, if a shareholder received cash or other property in
addition to stock, the Preliminary Report proposed that the cash or other
property might or might not be a dividend, but, unlike present law, the
amount of the dividend would not be limited to the realized gain, and
dividend treatment would be determined by looking at the reduction in the
shareholder's interest in the acquiring corporation, not the acquired
corporation, with the result that pro rata payments of cash to the acquired
corporation's shareholders may be treated as capital gain.3 6 For example, if
the shareholders of an acquired corporation received stock worth $100x and
cash of $33x, and the stock represented 10% of the acquiring corporation's
stock, the gain recognized by the acquired corporation's shareholders on
account of the cash would be capital gain since the transaction would be
viewed as though the shareholders had received stock representing 12.85% of
34. Idt at 60-61.
35. Id. at 62-64.
36. Id at 63-64.
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the acquired corporation's stock and then surrendered 2.875% for cash, a
reduction in interest of more than 20%.
In recognition of the fact that the broad repeal of General Utilities was
unlikely to be acceptable, the Preliminary Report recommended that the
Senate Finance Committee consider a number of possible measures to
provide some relief from the capital gains tax that would otherwise be
imposed on corporations that distributed appreciated property to
shareholders in a liquidation or are acquired in cost basis acquisitions or
mergers including (i) an exemption or phase-in of the capital gains tax
payable by the corporation on capital assets that had been held for a long
period of time, (ii) a shareholder credit for the capital gains tax payable by the
corporation, or (iii) a reduction in the rate of corporate or shareholder capital
gains tax.3 7 In general, these measures would only provide relief from the
tax payable by the corporation on capital assets; they would not provide relief
with respect to ordinary income assets, such as inventory. Since General
Utilities would be overruled and relief limited to capital gain, it would in any
event be possible to repeal the collapsible corporation provisions of the
Internal Revenue Code.
B. The Carryover Proposals
The Preliminary Report also addressed the treatment of net operating loss
and other carryovers following a corporate acquisition or a merger.3 8 This
treatment had been an area of focus since 1976 when, in the Tax Reform Act
of 1976,39 Congress revised the rules. Responding to criticism, however,
Congress has successively deferred the effective date of the new carryover
provisions.4o
Both the rules enacted in 1976 (and then deferred) and those which they
replaced made the availability of net operating loss and other carryovers turn
on the precise form of the transaction and produce widely varying results
depending on arguably irrelevant factors. These formalistic rules were
overlaid by section 269, which disallowed loss and other carryovers when the
principal purpose of the acquisition was to obtain the loss. 4 1
Under the proposals made by the Preliminary Report, loss and other
carryovers will be available following a corporate acquisition or merger only if
a carryover basis was elected for the assets of the acquired corporation. 42 Net
operating and capital loss carryovers and carryovers of unused investment
and foreign tax credits will then be limited by two rules.
37. Id at 93-94.
38. Id. at 67-76.
39. Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 806, 90 Stat. 1520, codified at I.R.C. § 1348 (West 1981).
40. Most recently, in the Tax Reform Act of 1984, enacted as Division A of the Deficit Reduction
Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 62(a), 98 Stat. 494, which deferred the effective date until at least
1986.
41. I.R.C. § 269 (Lawyers Co-op. 1974 & Supp. 1985).
42. STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON FINANCE, THE REFORM AND SIMPLIFICATION OF THE INCOME
TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS, supra note 32, at 68.
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Under the first rule (the so-called "merger rule"), relating to acquisitions
that are of common or preferred stock, a net operating loss or other
carryover can be used against a percentage of the taxable income of the
acquiring corporation attributable to the common stock issued in the
acquisition, adjusted downward to exclude the part of the stock issued for the
loss or other carryover. 43 Under a table set out in the Report, the percentage
would be .5% for each of the first twenty percentage points of the acquiring
corporation's common stock issued to the acquired corporation's
shareholders, .75% for each of the next twenty percentage points, 1% for
each of the next twenty percentage points, 1.25% for each of the next twenty
percentage points, and 1.50% for each of the next twenty percentage
points.44 The resulting income figure would be further reduced if the
acquiring corporation had preferred stock outstanding which is not used in
the acquisition to take account of the corporate income tax on the dividends
payable on the preferred stock. If preferred stock were issued in the
acquisition, the limit would be the yield on the preferred stock and any limit
not used in one year could be carried forward.
Thus, if one corporation acquired another by merger for 20% of its
common stock, any net operating loss of the merged corporation would be
allowable each year until it expired against 10% of the combined taxable
income of the acquiring corporation and its consolidated subsidiaries. If the
consideration was preferred stock providing for a cumulative annual dividend
of $3 million, the net operating loss of the acquired corporation would be
allowable each year during the carryover period against $3 million of the
combined taxable income of the acquiring corporation and its consolidated
subsidiaries plus any part of the limitation not used in a prior year. If the
consideration was 20% of the acquired corporation's common stock and a
preferred stock providing for a cumulative annual dividend of $3 million, the
annual limitation on the use of the loss would be $3 million plus 10% of
combined taxable income in excess of $3 million and any part of the $3
million not used in a prior year.
Under the second rule (the so-called "purchase rule"), relating principally
to acquisitions for cash or property other than stock, a net operating loss or
other carryovers will be allowable each year up to the amount of an interest-
like after-tax rate of return on the purchase price; the Report suggests, for
example, 125% of the interest rate on income tax deficiencies. Thus, if one
corporation acquired another for $50 million in cash, and the rate of return
were 15%, the loss of the acquired corporation would be allowable against the
combined taxable income of the acquiring corporation and its consolidated
subsidiaries in each year during the carryover period to the extent of $7.5
million plus the part of the limitation not used in a prior year.
The merger and purchase rules could both apply so that, for example, if a
loss corporation were acquired for $10 million in cash and 5% of the insurer's
43. Id. at 71.
44. Id. at 72.
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common stock (assuming that the rate of return were 15%), the net operating
loss of the acquired corporation would be allowed each year against the
combined taxable income of the acquiring corporation and its consolidated
subsidiaries. That loss would be allowed to the extent of $1.5 million, 2.5%
of combined taxable income in excess of $1.5 million, and any part of the $1.5
million not used in a prior year.
Under both the merger and purchase rules there would be no incentive to
acquire a corporation that had no assets other than a carryover since, in effect,
the acquiring corporation would be paying more than the value of the tax
benefit; nor, in cases where the loss corporation had business assets, would
there be any incentive to pay more for the loss than it was worth to the
acquired corporation.
The limitation on net operating loss and other carryovers would be
triggered by redemptions and new issuances of stock by a loss corporation,
and there would be special rules for "built in" gains and losses.
C. Reaction to the Preliminary Report
The reaction to the Preliminary Report was confused by inclusion in the
Report of proposals that were essentially unrelated to the main line
acquisition and attribute carryover proposals. The subsequent debate, and
the hearing held by the Senate Finance Committee, focused principally on
issues such as whether, as the Preliminary Report proposed, publicly-traded
limited partnerships should be treated as corporations and whether 85%
dividends should receive the deduction denied to debt financed stock. Only
bar associations and other disinterested observers, therefore, spent any time
on the acquisition and carryover rules.45
Leaving aside the question of relief from the repeal of General Utilities, it
was hard for any objective observer to do other than applaud the basic
acquisition and carryover proposals. No one can honestly defend the
formalistic merger and acquisition rules in Subchapter C. The Preliminary
Report's proposals, which relied heavily on the work of the American Law
Institute, were well thought through and undeniably sound.46 The question
evolved, therefore, into the price to be paid for reform; that is, whether the
acquisition rules need be accompanied by a complete overruling of General
Utilities; whether, if there were a complete overruling, there should be some
relief and, if there were to be relief, the form that it should take.
Although the attribute carryover proposals were the subject of hearings in
both the House and Senate, they did not attract much attention, possibly
because they made so much more sense than present law or the proposals
adopted in 1976. The debate centered on whether it was better, as the
45. Senate Hearing 98-556 Before the Senate Finance Comm. on Rform of Corporate Taxation, 98th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1983).
46. THE AMERICAN LAW INsITrrUTE, FEDERAL INCOME TAX PROJECT (Subchapter C 1982); see also
Land, Unallocated Premium in Corporate Acquisitions under the American Law Institute Subchapter C Proposals,
34 TAx LAw. 341 (1981).
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Preliminary Report had proposed, to have both a merger rule and a purchase
rule, or whether a single purchase rule would be preferable. 47 The common
purpose of both solutions is to permit the loss or other carryovers to survive
only in an amount equal to their value to the acquired corporation at the time
of its acquisition or, put differently, to allow no more of the carryovers to be
used by the new owners than those which could have been used by the
carryover corporation had there been no acquisition. The merger rule does
this by limiting the carryovers to the after-tax income attributable to the stock
issued in the merger. Because other consideration may also be issued (and
the income attributable to some kinds of stock may not be all that easy to
determine), the merger rule cannot operate alone and it must be
supplemented by a purchase rule. A purchase rule can either limit the loss to
the after-tax income which the purchase price will yield at an assumed rate of
return or to a principal sum, that is, the sum which invested at that assumed
rate of return will produce that income on an after-tax basis.
The argument for a single purchase price rule is that one rule is always
more simple than two and only a purchase rule can operate by itself. The
contrary argument is that the merger rule is more accurate because it reflects
the parties' real agreement, not a calculation based on statutory assumptions
as to rates of returns and other matters. It is apparent, in any event, that the
differences between the two rules are not nearly as important as their
common purpose, which is to neutralize the value of carryovers in
acquisitions.
IV
THE 1984 ACT
The 1984 Act did not take up the main line proposals of the Senate
Finance Committee staff on acquisitions and mergers and operating loss
carryovers. Consideration of operating loss carryovers was deferred and
further work on acquisitions and mergers will also presumably wait until 1985
or later.48 The Act did, however, follow through on a large number of the
other proposals made in the Preliminary Report.
A. Treatment of Dividend Distributions
One of the principal revisions to Subchapter C made by the 1984 Act is to
provide, with limited exceptions, for the recognition of gain on dividend
distributions of appreciated property to shareholders. That revision reflects
the view that "under a double-tax system, the distributing corporation
generally should be taxed on any appreciation in value of any property
47. Bacon & Tomasulo, Net Operating Loss and Credit Carryovers: The Search for Corporate Identity, 20
TAx NoTEs 835 (1983).
48. The Staff of the Senate Finance Committee has spent time on drafting proposals. See, e.g.,
Bernick, Dole, Rostenkowski Expected to Continue Drive for Tax Bill, 22 TAx NoTEs 171, 172 (1984).
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distributed in a non-liquidating distribution."'49 Thus, General Utilities is now
largely restricted to complete liquidations and certain other limited
situations. 50
Repeal of General Utilities for dividend distributions had a double impact on
Subchapter C since, in practice, dividends of appreciated property by
publicly-held corporations largely have been distributions of units in royalty
trusts. 5 ' The repeal thus slows the move to the disincorporation of assets.
The recognition of gain on such a distribution operates as a double deterrent
since, in addition to tax at the corporate level, it will generate earnings and
profits and thus eliminate for many oil companies the possibility that a royalty
trust could be distributed without tax to the shareholders. Along the same
lines, in making it clear that there was recapture on the distribution of
interests in a partnership, the 1984 Act discourages the use of partnerships to
disincorporate. 52
B. Earnings and Profits
Other changes that might be in the same category as the treatment of
dividend distributions were the provisions expanding the definition of
earnings and profits and thus the extent to which corporate distributions will
be dividends taxable to shareholders. Although the provisions of the 1982
Act that restricted the use of completed contract accounting were directed at
the calculation of taxable income, rather than at earnings and profits, they had
the same effect for some contractors. 53 Expansions of earnings and profits in
the 1984 Act included the amortization for earnings and profits purposes of a
number of expenses that are currently deductible in computing taxable
income, including: intangible drilling costs; the acceleration for earnings and
profits purposes of certain income deferred in calculating taxable income,
such as income reported on an installment basis; and the extension for
earnings and profits purposes (beyond the extension for taxable income
purposes) of depreciable lives on real property, reversing in part rules that
had been adopted in the 1981 Act.54
The Preliminary Report had proposed the elimination of the earnings and
profits concept (with a narrow exception for returns of initial capital), but
Congress apparently was persuaded that this went too far and that a more
targeted proposal was a better solution, or at least more likely of enactment.
Who was right? One difficulty with eliminating earnings and profits is its use
in calculating the "deemed paid" foreign tax credit. Another difficulty is that,
49. H.R. REP. No. 432, Part 2, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 1190 (1984); S. REP. No. 169, 98th Cong.,
2d Sess. 270 (1984).
50. See I.R.C. § 311(d) (Lawyers Co-op. Supp. 1985).
51. No doubt oil companies that were concerned with attempts by raiders to force such
distributions were not indifferent to this provision.
52. I.R.C. § 386 (Lawyers Co-op. Supp. 1985).
53. Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248, § 229, 96 Stat. 324,
493-95.
54. Tax Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 61(a), (b), 98 Stat. 494, 580, 581.
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because of the 85% dividends received deduction, dividend treatment is
generally better than any other for corporate shareholders. For large
corporations, earnings and profits may indeed only be relevant insofar as they
affect the calculation of the foreign tax credit. The Act recognized those
issues in part, and it deferred the application of some of the new rules to those
foreign corporations which derive less than 20% of their gross income from
the United States. The Act also limited the new rules in the case of
distributions to certain large corporate shareholders. 55 But, it is questionable
whether the earnings and profits limitation should be done away with until
these problems have been much more thoroughly explored.
C. Pass-through Entities
One change proposed in the Preliminary Report, not reflected in the 1984
Act, was to treat publicly-traded limited partnerships as corporations. The
Preliminary Report had recommended that result essentially on the ground
that limited partnerships resembled corporations in their size and operation
(describing them as "large, centralized business organizations"). The
recommendation could also be justified on the basis that it is almost
impossible in a meaningful way to audit a partnership with a large number of
ever-changing partners. Such a change would have prevented one major
method of avoiding Subchapter C since trusts and other pass-through entities
are only available in limited circumstances. The Treasury proposals made in
late 1984 endorse corporate treatment of large limited partnerships. 56
Even though the 1984 Act did not deal with publicly-traded partnerships,
the changes it made in the treatment of dividends of appreciated property will
have the effect of restricting the growth of these and other pass-through
entities, such as royalty trusts, in cases where they are created by distributing
interests to shareholders. 57 The restrictions on "stapled" stock can also be
viewed as related to the problem of pass-through entities in the sense that
stapling was principally used to staple interests in a regular corporation with
interests in an entity not subject to U.S. corporate tax, whether because it was
a foreign corporation or a pass-through entity such as a real estate investment
trust.58 In addition, the 1984 Act made it substantially impossible for an
operating company to adopt pass-through status by converting into a
regulated investment company. 59 It did so by denying regulated investment
company treatment to any corporation that was not theretofore a regulated
investment company unless it distributes out its earnings and profits.60 Thus,
it will no longer be possible for a corporation which sells its assets and has a
sufficient number of shareholders to register under the Investment Company
55. Id. § 54, 98 Stat. at 568-71.
56. 2 TREAS. REPORT, supra note 4, at 146-50.
57. Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 54(a)(1), 98 Stat. 494, 568-69.
58. Id § 136(a), 98 Stat. at 669.
59. Id
60. Id. § 107(a)(3), 98 Stat. at 1049-50.
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Act of 1940 in order to elect to be taxed under Subchapter M, unless it first
pays out its earnings and profits as a dividend.
D. Other Provisions
Apart from the foregoing, both the 1982 and 1984 Acts include a large
number of provisions intended to eliminate what might be perceived as
abuses in Subchapter C. In the 1982 Act these provisions consisted of
measures designed to eliminate an arguable overlap between the
nonrecognition provisions of section 351 and the dividend rules of section
304,61 an expansion of the definition of section 306 stock62 and of the rules
for determining dividend equivlency under section 356.63 In the 1984 Act,
changes in Subchapter C included: strengthening the accumulated earnings
tax provisions; 64 conforming the stock ownership rules of sections 304 and
368(a)(1)(D); 65 requiring that the transferor in a "C" reorganization
distribute all its assets in liquidation;66 revising the consolidated return rule
intended to prevent consolidation where less than 80% in value is owned;6 7
and extending the concept of collapsible corporations. 68
There were also extensive changes to the 85% dividend received
deduction in the 1984 Act, principally to reduce the deduction where stock is
debt-financed. 69 The dividends received deduction has been viewed as an
essential part of a system of double taxation since it prevents multiple taxation
of corporate income as it passes from one corporation to another as opposed
to the ultimate individual shareholder. It is unclear why, in the context of this
purpose, the allowance of a deduction for interest on debt incurred to
purchase or carry stock was viewed as a "double deduction" or otherwise
abusive.
V
CONCLUSION
The changes made in Subchapter C by the 1981, 1982, and 1984 Acts were
accompanied by a continuing reduction in effective corporate income tax
rates. According to the Study of 1982 Effective Tax Rates of Selected U.S.
Corporations, prepared by the Staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation, 70 the
average effective corporate income tax rate on the U.S. income of the selected
corporations declined from 21.8% in 1980 to 17.2% in 1981 and to 16.1% in
61. Pub. L. No. 97-248, § 226(a), 96 Stat. 324, 490.
62. Id. §§ 226(b), 227(a), 96 Stat. at 512.
63. Id. § 227(b), 96 Stat. at 492.
64. Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 58(a), 98 Stat. 494, 574; id. § 58(b), 98 Stat. at 575.
65. Id. § 64(a), 98 Stat. at 584.
66. Id. § 63(a), 98 Stat. at 583.
67. Id § 60(a), 98 Stat. at 578.
68. Id. § 65(a), (b), 98 Stat. at 584.
69. Id § 51A, 98 Stat. at 562.
70. STAFF OF THE JoINT COMM. ON TAXATxON, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., STUDY OF 1982 EFFECTIVE
TAX RATES OF LAXGE U.S. CORPORATIONS (Comm. Print 1983).
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1982. Similarly, the corporate income tax has continued to decline as a
proportion of the revenues of the federal government, both as a result of
declining corporate income and through the legislated reduction in the
corporate tax burden. While in 1950 corporate profits income tax accruals
were 28.3% of the total receipts, by 1980 this figure had declined to 13.3%,
in 1981 it was 11.5%, in 1982 it was 8.1%, and in 1983 it was under 7%.
The Joint Committee Study also shows a wide variance between the
effective corporate income tax rates on different industries. The effective rate
of income tax on income from the United States of the selected corporations
ranged between over 30% for industries such as trucking, food processors,
pharmaceuticals, and tobacco, to rates below 20% for the electronics
industry, the petroleum industry, and utilities, to negative rates for the
aerospace and chemical industries and financial institutions. It can be argued
in fact that, after taking an average interest deduction into account as well as
the other investment tax benefits, the effective tax rate for the average new
investment is generally negative and therefore more beneficial than repeal of
the corporate income tax.
Notwithstanding the reduction of the corporate tax burden, the effect of
many of the changes made to Subchapter C by the 1981, 1982, and 1984 Acts
is to strengthen the structure of the existing system of double taxation of
corporate income. This undeniably is the effect of eliminating nonrecognition
of income for distributions of property, expanding earnings and profits, and
extending the accumulated earnings tax provisions; the changes in the
treatment of acquisitions made in the 1982 Act were also consistent. Does
this make sense?
However strongly one may favor the integration of corporate and
shareholder income taxes, it is difficult to argue that integration should be
effected by preserving General Utilities or through quirks in the definition of
earnings and profits. On balance, therefore, it is unfair to object to what has
happened to Subchapter C on the ground that the changes eliminate the
"integration" of corporate and shareholder taxation that was in Subchapter
C. The reduction in the corporate tax burden that accompanied these
changes, however, had the effect of eliminating any strong constituency for
serious integration proposals. The benefits of these proposals have
traditionally been limited to taxpaying corporations. To the extent that a
great many corporations pay little or no federal income tax, the pressure to
integrate is removed.
Tax legislation since 1980, however, may be faulted on a number of
grounds. First, the piecemeal approach to a repeal of General Utilities is not
sensible. Imposing a tax at the corporate level on dividend distributions but
leaving General Utilities in place in other situations defers distributions until
General Utilities applies, as in, for example, a complete liquidation. A repeal of
General Utilities, with or without relief, would eliminate the resulting distortion.
Another shortcoming has been the failure to come to grips directly with
the treatment of pass-through entities and the extent to which they can be
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used to disincorporate assets that would otherwise be held in regular
corporations. The advantages of pass-through statutes are too great to
believe that the new rules on corporate distributions will deter the formation
of royalty trusts and the continued use of publicly-traded partnerships. The
chance that congressional legislation will be able to deal with this
phenomenon will diminish as the market significance, and thus the political
power, of these entities grows. As it stands now, royalty trusts can be used to
hold oil and gas and other mineral interests and eliminate corporate tax on oil
and gas and other mineral income, as well as giving certificate holders the
chance to recover their investment against ordinary income. Publicly-traded
partnerships confer the same advantages so long as a section 754 election is
available so that the price paid by new investors is reflected in their shares of
partnership taxable income. The need to address this comprehensively will
become even more acute if, as proposed by the Preliminary Report, section
337 is repealed and gain is recognized on the distribution of property in a
liquidation of a corporation. The Treasury proposals made in late 1984
would handle this in the case of limited partnerships (and possibly trusts, as
well) but the fate of those proposals is uncertain.
It is also unclear to what extent any consideration has been given to the
practical effect of the new asset write-up rules on corporate acquisitions and
mergers. Recapture of investment credit and ACRS and other deductions, if
they must be paid, are an upfront cost, while the benefits of any write-up are
ordinarily realized only over time through larger deductions for amortization,
depletion, depreciation, and cost of goods sold. In equipment intensive
businesses, therefore, it is unlikely that a section 338 election will be
beneficial; and, conversely, the election will more likely be made when there
are amortizable assets, such as life insurance in force or leases, that can be
written up without any recapture. If the proposals in the Preliminary Report
were adopted, a cost basis election might be unattractive for everyone,
depending on the form of relief from General Utilities. But, until then, the
section 338 rules will lead to quite different results, depending on the target
corporation's business.
There is little evidence that this was understood at the time the 1982 Act
was passed. The problem is the unevenness of recapture provisions (and of
the related "tax benefit" doctrine). Why should it be more advantageous to
write up the assets of a life insurance company than of a manufacturing
company? The changes made by the 1982 Act will also increase the pressure
to amortize intangibles (in effect, they will narrow what is treated as
"goodwill"), and some of this is already apparent in the positions being taken
with respect to acquisitions of banks. 71 The uneven operation of the
recapture rules might be eliminated if the acquisition proposals in the
Preliminary Report were adopted, depending on the form of relief from the
71. See, e.g., Southern Bancorporation, Inc. v. United States, 732 F.2d 374 (4th Cir. 1984); Banc
One Corp., 84 T.C. 84.35 (1985); Midlantic Nat'l Bank/Merchants, 52 T.C.M. (P-H) 83,581
(1983).
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repeal of General Utilities, but (as noted above) there might then never be an
incentive to elect a cost basis in a corporate acquisition. Is that desirable?
Again, there is no evidence that this has been a factor in the development of
those proposals.
A strong system of double taxation of corporate income also puts pressure
on the distinction between debt and equity, at least for taxable corporations.
And the failure of the Treasury Department to develop acceptable rules under
section 385 no doubt reflects the importance of shareholder debt as a way of
reducing the corporate tax burden, although in many cases the proposed
regulations were prepared to sacrifice corporate tax so long as the
shareholder-creditors were appropriately taxed. The overwhelming
importance of the interest deductions apparent from the surge of leveraged
buyouts, which rely more on that deduction than on any asset write-ups, and
from the sometimes unsuccessful effort to develop instruments (for example,
"ARCN's" or adjustable rate convertible notes7 2) which are perceived as
equity for some purposes but treated as debt for tax purposes. Certainly none
of the structural changes made by the 1981, 1982, or 1984 Acts reversed the
bias towards financing with debt securities that generally inheres in a
nonintegrated corporate tax (the main exception being the allowance of
deductions for certain contributions and dividends paid in connection with
ESOP's). Indeed, some of the changes in the 1984 Act (the elimination of so-
called debt equity swaps, the restriction on the 85% dividends received
deduction, and the allowance of a partial income exclusion to interest on
loans to ESOP's) point the other way. Again, the Treasury proposals made in
late 1984 would deal with this (principally by allowing a deduction for 50% of
dividends paid out of taxable income) but the fate of those proposals is
uncertain. And the choice of a dividends paid deduction, in lieu of a
shareholder credit, as a means for integrating casts some doubt on the
sincerity of the proposal. 73
There seems, finally, to have been only minimal consideration of the effect
of many of these changes in the foreign area. The foreign tax credit effects of
extending changes in Subchapter C to foreign operations is very significant, a
point that seems largely to have been missed. Thus, a section 338 election, if
made with respect to a foreign corporation, may be relevant only because it
will eliminate existing earnings and profits and affect the earnings and profits
of later years, and the "deemed paid" foreign tax credit will be calculated on
this basis, notwithstanding that the foreign tax jurisdiction is unlikely to pay
any attention to the election. The effect will be a distortion in the foreign tax
credit that may in some cases benefit or hurt taxpayers. Direct changes to the
72. Rev. Rul. 83-98, 1983-2 C.B. 40.
73. The problem with the deduction, as opposed to the credit, is the limited ability to stem the
revenue loss from dividends paid to tax exempt and treaty-country foreign shareholders. Are we
really to believe that the Treasury would endorse an effective 22.5% rate for foreign subsidiaries of
Netherlands corporations? The discussion of this in the Treasury proposals seems intended to
bolster the U.S. negotiating position in treaty negotiations. See the discussion in 2 TREAS. REPORT,
supra note 4, at 142-43.
[Vol. 48: No. 4
Page 57: Autumn 1985] SUBCHAPTER C 75
definition of earnings and profits have the same effect. It would make more
sense to approach this area with the foreign tax credit in mind and at least to
consider a water's edge approach to many of the changes made in Subchapter
C.
Finally, the problem of net operating loss and other carryovers has
expanded and remains unresolved. We are still without workable rules on net
operating loss and other carryovers more than eight years after Congress first
began to revise those rules in the Tax Reform Act of 1976. The Preliminary
Report and the hearings on its carryover proposals, both in the Senate and
the House, have so far produced nothing concrete. This is so,
notwithstanding the increase in loss and credit carryovers from the changes in'
depreciation in the 1981 Act. This has led to new pressures, many of which
will not be solved by the adoption of the proposals in the Preliminary Report.
Examples of the new pressures are the use of partnerships with loss partners
in leveraged buyouts and the use of losses to convert taxable interest income
into dividends eligible for the 85% dividends received deduction.

